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2		DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM
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5		MARY L. M. MORAN CLERK OF COURT
6	DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM (78)	
7	TERRITORY OF GUAM	
8	ALAN SADHWANI et al.,	Civil Case No. 03-00036
9	Plaintiffs,	
10	vs.	
11	HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING	
12	CORPORATION, LTD., et al.,	ORDER
13	Defendants.	
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15	On February 13, 2004, this case came before the Court for hearing on a Motion to	
16	Dismiss filed by defendant Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. ("HSBC"). Present at	
17	the hearing were Attorneys Anita P. Arriola and Joaquin C. Arriola for the Plaintiffs. Attorney	
18	Jacques A. Bronze appeared on behalf of HSBC. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court	
19	took the motion under advisement. The Court now issues this written Order setting forth the	
20	bases for its rulings herein.	
21	FACTS	
22	The Complaint raises six separate causes of action which arise out of a long relationship	
23	between the parties. The Plaintiffs have been customers of HSBC for approximately 25 years.	
24	Complaint at ¶5. The Plaintiffs first went into business as Tick Tock, in 1978. Id. Mr.	
25	Sadhwani met the then manager of HSBC in 1978 and has since banked exclusively with HSBC	
26	(with the exception for credit card deposits to Citibank because HSBC, a foreign corporation, did	
27	not accept credit card deposits from merchants). Id. The Plaintiffs assert that all of their deposits	
28	and borrowings were with HSBC exclusively. Id. Over the 25 years, the Plaintiffs have	

deposited about \$100 million with HSBC. <u>Id.</u> The Plaintiffs also socialized with the bank managers (who changed every 3 years) at Mr. Sadhwani's home, at the home of the bank managers, or in restaurants. <u>Id.</u> By virtue of this long-standing relationship, the Plaintiffs assert that they placed explicit faith, trust, and confidence in HSBC, trusting that the bank and its officers/employees would deal with them in a fair and honest manner. <u>Id.</u>

In September 2002, the Plaintiffs had an outstanding loan balance of over \$6.8 million with HSBC (the "Loan"). When HSBC determined it would discontinue its operations in Guam, it "placed pressure" on the Plaintiffs to pay off the Loan. Thus, on March 5, 2003, the parties entered into a Promissory Note Modification Agreement (see Exhibit C to Complaint), which extended the maturity date of the Note to August 31, 2003.

Prior to March 5, 2003, however, the parties met on February 13, 2003. HSBC sent a letter to Mr. Sadhwani on February 17, 2003 (see Exhibit B to Complaint). This letter purports to memorialize the February 13, 2003 meeting wherein the parties discussed, among other things, extending the maturity date of the Note to the end of August 2003 and Mr. Sadhwani's listing of certain securing real estate properties with Century 21.

Following the execution of the Promissory Note Modification Agreement, on March 6, 2003, HSBC sent a letter to Mr. Sadhwani (see Exhibit D to Complaint). The letter reiterated the parties' discussions on March 5, 2003. The letter indicates that Mr. Sadhwani had agreed to provide HSBC with a written plan by March 12, 2003. Said written plan would explain how Mr. Sadhwani would repay the Note by the due date. Additionally, the letter stated that HSBC was "prepared, without in any way committing itself at this stage, to consider a discount on the loan balance if [Mr. Sadhwani] elect[ed] to give the secured properties to [HSBC]. This 'friendly foreclosure' method would transfer the burden of property liquidation to [HSBC] and minimise (sic) legal fees for both parties." Exhibit D to Complaint at ¶3. HSBC went on to state that if Mr. Sadhwani wished "to explore this approach," he should assign a value to the property

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> HSBC's decision to discontinue its operations in Guam appears to be the propelling event in this lawsuit.

a submit a written proposal for HSBC's consideration. Id.

On March 13, 2003, HSBC again wrote to Mr. Sadhwani. See Exhibit E to Complaint. The letter stated that Mr. Sadhwani had failed to provide the written plan by March 12, 2003 as agreed upon. HSBC stated that it would need the written plan by that day (March 13, 2003) so that it could "understand how [Mr. Sadhwani] intend[s] on repaying the loan by the revised maturity date." Id. The bank also urged Mr. Sadhwani to "consider [its] recommended approach under 'friendly foreclosure." Id.

On March 14, 2003, Mr. Sadhwani wrote to HSBC. See Exhibit F to Complaint. Mr. Sadhwani stated that he was "working with a bank to pay off [the] outstanding loan with [HSBC]." Id. Mr. Sadhwani requested more information about the "friendly foreclosure" since he did not understand what exactly HSBC wanted. Id. Mr. Sadhwani also asked HSBC to explain the "discounting" and how that would happen. Id.

On March 21, 2003, HSBC once again wrote to Mr. Sadhwani. See Exhibit G to Complaint. This letter (which the Plaintiffs refer to as the "work out agreement" in the Complaint and in its Opposition Brief) detailed several options which HSBC gave to the Plaintiffs. See id. The first option was that Mr. Sadhwani could continue to list his properties with Century 21. If he was able to sell the property at market price and had the listing agreements, the Bank "may consider tolling collection efforts pending the closing in escrow of written accepted purchase offers with net proceeds paid to [HSBC]." Id. In the event he was unable to sell the properties through Century 21, Mr. Sadhwani's second option was that HSBC "may consider accepting deeds in lieu of foreclosure at negotiated values." Id. Finally, Mr. Sadhwani could avoid the entire process if he were "seriously making an effort to refinance [the] loan facility." Id. If Mr. Sadhwani was proceeding via this route, HSBC requested "immediate confirmation of your loan application and efforts to obtaining refinancing." Id. HSBC stated that it was "ready, able and willing to assist [Mr. Sadhwani's] negotiation of replacement financing." Id. In conclusion, HSBC requested Mr. Sadhwani to respond to the letter with the required information by April 4, 2003.

In reliance upon this "work out agreement," the Plaintiffs assert that they took all

necessary steps to either sell their properties or try to obtain alternate financing. On April 3, 2003, Century 21 provided Mr. Sadhwani with a letter detailing its efforts to market the Plaintiffs' properties. See Exhibit H to Complaint. Additionally, Mr. Sadhwani wrote to HSBC on April 4, 2003, informing it that he tried to get the refinancing but had not yet received a confirmation of the loan. See Exhibit J to Complaint. Also, Mr. Sadhwani stated that he was still trying to sell the properties but that if he was unsuccessful, he would hand them over to HSBC. Mr. Sadhwani pleaded for "sometime" since he was working to satisfy the outstanding loan. Id.

On July 18, 2003, the Plaintiffs received from HSBC a "Notice of Intent to Sell Loan" (dated July 15, 2003). See Exhibit K to Complaint.

On July 22, 2003, Mr. Underwood, the Guam Manager of HSBC, met with Mr. Sadhwani at Mr. Sadhwani's office. See Complaint at ¶ 17. Mr. Sadhwani pleaded with Mr. Underwood not to sell the Loan and offered him \$3 million to settle the Loan. Mr. Underwood stated that HSBC would not accept that amount. Thus, Mr. Sadhwani asked whether \$3.5 million would be sufficient. Mr. Underwood stated "Get me the money or guarantee, and I will try to stop the sale." Id.

On July 31, 2003, Mr. Sadhwani wrote to Mr. Underwood and detailed his attempts to settle the Loan. See Exhibit L to Complaint. Thereafter, Messrs. Sadhwani and Underwood met again, and Mr. Underwood assured Mr. Sadhwani that if he received the offer (*i.e.*, money or bank letter) by August 8, 2003, Mr. Underwood would "see what [he could] do." Complaint at ¶ 18.

On August 5, 2003, Mr. Sadhwani sent HSBC a copy of a letter from First Hawaiian Bank See Exhibit M to Complaint. The letter was an "indication of the terms and conditions" for financing a loan to the Plaintiffs to pay off the HSBC Loan. <u>Id.</u> The letter explicitly stated that it should "not be construed as a commitment on the part of [First Hawaiian Bank], and is only provided for indication purposes only." <u>Id.</u>

On August 11, 2003, HSBC sent Mr. Sadhwani a letter informing him that as of August 11, 2003, the Loan was sold to Paradise Marine Corporation. See Exhibit O to

Complaint.

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Thereafter, the Plaintiffs brought suit against HSBC and Doe defendants in the Superior Court of Guam asserting six (6) separate causes of action. HSBC removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, HSBC brought the present Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiffs filed an Opposition Brief, and HSBC filed a Reply Brief. Because separate grounds are raised to dismiss the various causes of action, the Court will address each one in turn.

#### **ANALYSIS**

#### Standard for Motions to Dismiss

As noted by the Plaintiffs, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274) (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988)(overruled on other grounds)). This is because courts prefer to rule on the merits of a case rather than dismiss on the pleadings. <u>Cabo Distrib. Co., Inv. v.</u> Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Thus, "a complaint should not be dismissed . . . unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957). All allegations of material fact must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Desaigoudar v. Mevercord, 223 F.3d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1021, 121 S. Ct. 1962 (2001). The Court's role at this stage of the proceedings is not to evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of the claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974) (In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed, it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.")(overruled on other grounds). With this standard in mind, the Court now turns to the arguments raised in support of the dismissal of each cause of action.

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#### 1st Cause of Action – Breach of Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing

The first count of the Complaint alleges that HSBC acted in bad faith and failed to deal fairly with the Plaintiffs when it refused to agree to a commercially reasonable workout and refused to accept the alternative financing obtained by the Plaintiffs. See Complaint at ¶29.

HSBC argues that this cause of action should be dismissed for two reasons. First, HSBC contends that such a cause of action is not recognized by Guam law outside of insurance actions. In the alternative, HSBC argues that even if the cause of action was legally cognizable, the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to support such a claim.

As to HSBC's first argument, it is important to note that under the *Erie Doctrine*, in diversity cases, the federal court must apply state substantive law. <u>Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins</u>, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). The parties agree on this point. Thus, the focus is on whether Guam law would permit such an action in tort.

Most bad faith claims stemming from a contractual relationship arise in the insurer-insured context, and HSBC's motion cites to a plethora of these cases. HSBC's motion also notes that many courts have refused to recognize a bad faith action when a duty is breached in commercial contract cases outside of the insurance arena, holding instead that the aggrieved party merely has a breach of contract claim. HSBC contends that this is "an issue of first impression in Guam courts," and thus this Court must use "its own best judgment" in predicting how the Guam Supreme Court would rule on the matter. Motion at 1-2. However, as the Plaintiffs point out, while the Guam Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, a Superior Court of Guam judge has held that such a cause of action is cognizable under Guam law. See Ada's Inc., et al. v. First Hawaiian Bank, et al., Superior Court of Guam Civil Case No. CV0785-02, Decision and Order (July 7, 2003) (authored by Judge Joaquin V.E. Manibusan, Jr.), attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Opposition Brief. The Plaintiffs urge the Court to follow the reasoning established in Ada by Judge Manibusan. Because a Guam court has ruled on the matter, the Plaintiffs assert that all the other cases cited to by HSBC are irrelevant since the Court must apply Guam substantive law.

The facts of Ada are similar to those in the present case. There, the plaintiffs were

customers of First Hawaiian Bank ("FHB"). The plaintiffs sought damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and for breach of contract. FHB moved to dismiss and argued that when a duty in a commercial contract is breached, the resulting claim is merely one for breach of contract and no tort damages are available. The Ada decision, however, noted that

[t]he concept of a bad faith action within the context of a breach of a commercial contract in the banking area is relatively new and changing. Courts are beginning to see that such actions are plausible in the context of certain pleadings. Some see no difference between the problem of a bank customer and that of an insured. Ada at 9.

The Ada decision analyzed a variety of cases on the issue and held that

when a customer complains of a breach by a bank of a commercial contract a breach of contract action should be an appropriate remedy. However, a bad faith action commenced by a customer should not be dismissed simply because there is an available remedy under a breach of contract claim or merely because of the filing of the breach of contract claim. It is after all the general rule of law that a bank is required to adhere to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its customers. A bank's failure to adhere to this implied duty should not bar a bad faith action merely because there is a remedy in a breach of contract action. Furthermore, the fact that there is such a duty on banks with regards to their relationships with their customers indicate[s that a bad faith action] . . . is authorized under the law when facts alleging such bad faith are plead. Plaintiffs must allege some act of dishonesty by the bank and allege that the bank acted outside accepted commercial practices. When Plaintiffs do make such allegations, an appropriate cause of action is raised by the Plaintiff. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).

The Court finds Judge Manibusan's decision to be well reasoned. Based on this decision, it appears that in the banking arena, Guam law would recognize a cause of action for breach of bad faith arising from a breach of a commercial contract between a customer and a bank.

Nevertheless, HSBC urges the Court to ignore this local case on the basis that the Ada decision relied on the case of Seamen's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 206 Cal.

Rptr. 354 (1984), yet the Seamen's case and its progeny were overruled by the California Supreme Court decision in Freeman & Mills Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 420 (1995). This argument is unconvincing. The Freeman case was decided in 1995. The Ada decision was issued in July 2003. It would be reasonable to presume that Judge Manibusan was aware that Freeman overruled the Seamen's case, yet, because California caselaw is merely persuasive and not controlling, chose to follow the reasoning in Seamen's.

Additionally, it is important to note that neither the <u>Seaman's</u> or <u>Freeman</u> case involved the breach of a commercial contract between a bank and a customer. Rather, the <u>Seaman's</u> case involved a would-be dealer and an oil company, while the <u>Freeman</u> case concerned a contract between an accounting firm and an oil company.

While the <u>Freeman</u> case overruled the <u>Seamen's</u> decision, the California Supreme Court did so "in favor of a general rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract breach, at least in the absence of violation of 'an independent duty arising from principles of tort law' other than the bad faith denial of the existence of, or liability under, the breached contract." <u>Freeman</u>, 900 F.2f at 679-80 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeal majority that no "special relationship" between the parties existed to justify a tort theory of recovery. <u>Id.</u> at 671. Thus, the <u>Ada</u> decision does not conflict with the <u>Freeman</u> holding as Judge Manibusan found the existence of a "special relationship" in that banks have an implied duty of duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its customers. Similarly, in this case the Complaint does allege sufficient facts to support a finding that a "special relationship" existed between the Plaintiffs and HSBC.

The Court is bound by substantive local law on this issue. Although there is no definitive ruling by the Guam Supreme Court, the Court has before it a valid and well-reasoned decision by the Superior Court of Guam. The Court cannot and will not simply ignore this local decision which recognizes a cause of action available to plaintiffs under Guam law. Accordingly, the Court rejects HSBC's contention that the first cause of action should be dismissed as a matter of law.

As for its second argument, HSBC maintains that the Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to support such a claim. The Court notes it must assume that all facts in the Complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor. The Court does not have the option, at this stage, of evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the claims. Based on this standard, the Complaint sufficiently alleges facts that HSBC acted dishonestly and that it acted outside accepted commercial practices. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the First cause of action must be denied.

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### 2<sup>nd</sup> Cause of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation

The Plaintiffs' Second cause of action asserts that HSBC intentionally misrepresented that it was interested in pursuing a commercially reasonable work out, when it had no desire or intention to work out the Loan. See Complaint at ¶36.

HSBC raises two arguments why this cause of action should be dismissed. First, HSBC argues that because the Plaintiffs themselves failed to comply with the work out agreement by failing to obtain the alternative financing (a condition precedent), it should not be held responsible under the work out agreement. HSBC, however, fails to cite any authority for this proposition. The Plaintiffs should not be barred from alleging a claim against HSBC for intentional misrepresentation just because the they were only able to obtain an indication letter and not a commitment letter. The indication letter does show action by the Plaintiffs in accordance with the work out agreement.

HSBC's second argument is that its actions (or alleged misrepresentations) could not give rise to this cause of action because they were "mere promises of future conduct." Motion at 12-14. HSBC, however, misses the whole point behind the Plaintiffs' allegations. The Plaintiffs do not allege that HSBC promised to take action in the future but failed to do so. Rather, the Complaint alleges that HSBC made specific representations to the Plaintiffs knowing full well that it had no intention of performing. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that HSBC represented to the Plaintiffs that it would accept sales of the securing real properties and/or alternate financing when in fact HSBC was in the process of selling the Loan, yet it continued to let the Plaintiffs believe such representations even after the Loan was sold. Based on these allegations, the Complaint sufficiently establishes a claim for intentional misrepresentation. Thus, HSBC's motion to dismiss the Second cause of action must also be denied.

### 3rd Cause of Action - Breach of Contract: Promissory Note Modification Agreement

The Third cause of action asserts that HSBC breached the March 5, 2003 Promissory

Note Modification Agreement entered into by the parties. Specifically, HSBC breached said
agreement by (1) failing to review the Note every 6 months, see Complaint at ¶41, and (2) selling
the Loan to Paradise Marine Corporation, see Complaint at ¶42.

HSBC contends that the allegations supporting this cause of action fail to state a claim against HSBC upon which relief may be granted. Specifically, HSBC maintains that under Guam law, a promissory note which evidences a loan is a negotiable instrument. 13 GUAM CODE ANN. § 3104. Additionally, under Guam law a right arising out of an obligation is the property of the person to whom it is due and may be freely transferred. 18 GUAM CODE ANN. § 81102. There is nothing in the March 5, 2003 Promissory Note Modification Agreement which prohibits a transfer, sale, or assignment of the Note. Thus, HSBC asserts that selling the Loan to Paradise Marine Corporation ("PMC") could not form the basis for a breach of contract action.

The Plaintiffs do not discuss this issue in detail in their Opposition Brief. The Plaintiffs do state "when HSBC sold the Loan to PMC, HSBC breached the Loan agreement, as amended by the workout agreement." Plaintiffs' Opposition Brief at 11 (emphasis added). As HSBC notes, the Plaintiffs are confined by the actual words of the Complaint, and, unfortunately, the Third cause of action does not make any reference to the purported "work out agreement."

Additionally, HSBC states that the Plaintiffs' argument that HSBC somehow breached the Promissory Note Modification Agreement by not reviewing the Loan every six months is without merit. The Promissory Noted Modification Agreement was entered on March 5, 2003, yet the maturity date of the Note was set at August 31, 2003. The maturity date was less than 6 months away. Thus, what benefit is there to a review of the Note after the Note was supposed to be paid in full.

HSBC's motion to dismiss as to the Third cause of action is hereby granted. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Complaint fails to state a claim against HSBC upon which relief may be granted. However, this failure may be cured by amendment. Thus, dismissal of this cause of action is without prejudice.

### 4th Cause of Action – Breach of Contract: Work Out Agreement

The Plaintiffs' Fourth cause of action asserts that HSBC breached the work out agreement (Exhibit G to Complaint). Specifically, ¶46 of the Complaint states that

[HSBC] failed to assist Plaintiffs' negotiations for replacement financing; refused to accept the replacement financing as detailed in the terms and conditions for alternative financing from [FHB]; failed to give a "hairline discount" on the Loan

when Plaintiffs obtained the terms and conditions for alternative financing from [FHB]; and sold the Loan to [PMC] instead of complying with the parties' work out agreement. All of these acts constitute breaches of the work out agreement.

HSBC asserts that dismissal of this cause of action is warranted. HSBC contends that since the Plaintiffs failed to fulfill the express conditions precedent contained in the alleged work out agreement, this failure terminates HSBC's reciprocal obligation to perform under the said agreement. A similar argument was raised by HSBC in an attempt to dismiss the Second cause of action, but rejected by the Court. Likewise, the Court rejects the argument as it pertains to the Fourth cause of action. Moreover, as the Plaintiffs assert, the requirements of actually selling the properties and obtaining a commitment letter for alternate financing cannot be construed as "conditions precedent" since the work out agreement does not specify a time limitation for Plaintiffs to provide evidence of such efforts. Thus, only a reasonable length of time for performance is required. The Plaintiffs contend that HSBC did not give the Plaintiffs a reasonable period of time to obtain the alternate financing or close sales on the properties.

Unlike the Third cause of action which failed to sufficiently state a cause of action against HSBC, in this case, construing the facts contained in the Complaint as true and resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for breach of the work out agreement. Accordingly, HSBC's motion as to the Fourth cause of action is hereby denied.

### 5th Cause of Action - Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Fifth cause of action asserts a breach of fiduciary duty claim against HSBC. The Complaint describes the fiduciary relationship as follows:

[b]ecause of the longstanding, close and confidential relationship between [HSBC] and Plaintiffs, and by virtue of the trust and confidence which [HSBC] encouraged Plaintiffs to place in [it] and which the Plaintiffs did place in [HSBC], as well as the assurances that [HSBC] gave Plaintiffs that it would agree to a commercially reasonable work out, [HSBC] owed to Plaintiffs a duty of fiduciary care. Complaint at ¶49.

Specifically, the Complaint asserts specific acts by HSBC which resulted in the breach of this fiduciary duty:

A. By disclosing confidential information, including but not limited to, account

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and deposit information, loan payment history, and other banking transactions between Plaintiffs and [HSBC], to [PMC], a non-bank and purchaser of Plaintiffs' Loan with [HSBC];

B. By failing to assist Plaintiffs' negotiations for replacement financing, as [HSBC] had represented;

C. By refusing to accept the replacement financing as detailed in the terms and conditions for such financing from FHB and as required by the parties' work out agreement:

D. By failing to give a "hairline discount" on Plaintiffs' Loan when Plaintiffs obtained the terms and conditions for alternative financing from [FHB];

E. By selling the Loan to [PMC], a Guam corporation that is not licensed to conduct banking and has never conducted banking business in Guam. Complaint at ¶50.

HSBC acknowledges that under certain special circumstances, a lender may be found to have a fiduciary relationship with a borrower. However, HSBC maintains that in this case, the Fifth cause of action should be dismissed because the Complaint is devoid of any facts delineating how the relationship of trust and confidence arose or any other special circumstances that would establish a fiduciary relationship.

Again, the Court cannot evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims. Rather, the Court must accept as true the facts alleged in the Complaint, and it must also draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs. Based on this standard and the facts alleged, the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, HSBC's attempts to dismiss the Fifth cause of action is denied.

6th Cause of Action – Breach of Banking and Confidentiality Laws

The Sixth and final cause of action alleged in the Complaint is that

[a]bsent the consent of the plaintiffs, [HSBC] expressly or impliedly agreed that it ... [would] not divulge to third persons the terms or the state of Plaintiffs' accounts with [HSBC], any of their transactions with [HSBC], or any other information about the Plaintiffs acquired by [HSBC] through the 25 years of their banking relationship. The negotiation, sale, assignment, and transfer of Plaintiffs' Loan to [Paradise Marine Corporation] constitutes a breach of banking and confidentiality laws by [HSBC]." Complaint at ¶57.

HSBC complains that this cause of action must be dismissed because it (1) has no legal basis and (2) fails to allege any damages from the alleged breach. HSBC asserts that the Complaint does not cite to any law – federal or local – which would forbid it from assigning its rights under the Note to a third party. Additionally, the Complaint fails to allege any damages

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which resulted from the purported breach, and without damages Plaintiffs have no cause of action.

As to the first argument, HSBC is correct. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit liberal "notice pleading" and do not require specificity with regard to the correct legal theory or statute, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the complaint must contain sufficient notice to permit HSBC to prepare a defense. Here, the Complaint merely alleges a breach of "banking and confidentiality laws." The banking industry is a highly regulated one. There are a myriad of federal and local laws with which banks must comply. It is unreasonable to expect HSBC to sort through all banking laws and regulations to determine which one (or ones) it allegedly violated.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege how they have been injured or damaged by this alleged "breach of banking and confidentiality laws." Thus, the Court must dismiss this cause of action, however, such dismissal is without prejudice. The Plaintiffs are permitted to amend their Complaint to re-assert this cause of action and to specify what law(s) HSBC allegedly violated.

#### CONCLUSION

The Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Dismiss as to the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action. Additionally, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to the Third and Sixth Causes of Action, which are dismissed without prejudice. The Plaintiffs are hereby permitted to amend their Complaint to re-assert the dismissed causes of action.

SO ORDERED this 4th day of April, 2004.

JOHN S. UNPINGCO

District Judge

Notice is hereby given that this document was entered on the docket on APR 1.2.2004.

No separate notice of entry on the docket will

be issued by this Court.

Mary L. M. Morsa

Clerk, District Court of Guam

Deputy Clerk

APR 1 2 2004 Date